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Technical research has achieved strong advances in addressing 
security concerns in internet voting, yet the soluti ns are 
complicated and difficult to explain to the public. Accordingly, 
internet voting commonly faces opposition despite th benefits 
voters and authorities may expect. It appears that security features 
are only one premise underlying a system’s acceptance mong the 
electorate. The other challenge is to exploit these features at 
establishing the required trust among the public. In this paper we 
introduce a number of measures meant to help at gainin  trust. We 
hereby emphasize the importance of taking the exposition of a 
system's security features and the remaining risks as the 
foundation of any strategy. After describing the proposed 
measures and discussing both their advantages and pitfalls, we 
relate them to four commonly known applied internet voting 
systems.    
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.4.1 [Public Policy Issues] 
General Terms 
Management, Documentation, Design, Security, Human F ctors, 
Standardization, Legal Aspects, Verification. 
Keywords 
e-voting, elections, trust, internet, privacy, verifiability, 
transparency, evaluation, standards, acceptance 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade, many governments have begun to debate 
on introducing modern technology into their voting procedures.  
In the United States different types of electronic voting devices 
have already been in use for many years. Estonians h ve gained 
the experience of internet voting at two parliamentary elections, 
and numerous Swiss referenda have been conducted using the 
internet. After several trials at non-binding refernda, also 
Norwegian citizens will vote from their home computers at the 
binding municipal and county elections in fall 2011. Internet 
voting projects in the United States and Armenia are currently 
being assessed. In Germany and other countries internet voting is 
also in use, however only in the non-political context, i.e. at  
 
companies, universities and non-profit organizations. 
Voting technology comes with many promises. While some see 
the potential of saving significant time and money, others will 
hope to increase voter turnout due to easy and flexible 
participation. Also, voters may expect mechanisms to validate 
their ballot to avoid an invalid vote, and the needs of disabled 
people can be addressed adequately. Although many st keholders 
in voting are likely to benefit from such features in some way, 
voting technology still faces opposition and distru. 
Correspondingly, they do not accept the technology. Along with 
privacy concerns, critics express their doubts regarding the 
integrity of the outcome of elections. Accordingly, distrust 
towards the Irish voting machines culminated in the cancellation 
of the respective project shortly before going live. For similar 
reasons Germany and the Netherlands have persistently banned 
their voting machines from use at political votes.  
Trust in voting technology that lasts can only be established when 
operating a system that complies with high security standards. On 
the other hand, securing a system even to the maximum 
imaginable extent alone will hardly increase any trust among the 
public. In order to avoid the fate of the voting machines in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland, we must not oly ask 
ourselves how to make systems that are more secure. The focus 
should rather lie on the primary, superordinate question of how to 
establish trust itself and in particular trust that lasts. 
We perceive a voting system as “trusted” if it attrac s voters and if 
it leads to confidence regarding the integrity of the published 
results and the secrecy of the vote. Apparently, systems may be 
well-accepted despite being unworthy of trust. Such a situation 
may emerge from a combination of initial blind trust or 
indifference among the public and an exposition by the voting 
authorities that does not relate to the employed security features. 
However, it seems that such acceptance is fragile and may easily 
be disrupted in the event of even small irregularities. Due to its 
lacking persistence, we believe that “trust based on unawareness” 
holds much potential for the failure of systems that actually 
deserve to be trusted. In our framework we therefore define a class 
of measures focusing on establishing “justified” trus , i.e. trust 
that grounds on openly exposed security features and their 
assessment by experts. A second class of measures is meant to 
attract voters who have other personal reasons not to cast an 
electronic vote, for instance due to distrusting their own technical 
abilities.  
In the following section we start off by giving a first introduction 
to the measures that seem likely to have a positive impact on the 
public's view of a voting system. Section 3 shows related work 
that motivates the selection of our measures. Our further 
exposition will relate to the two prominent voting systems 
employed at parliamentary elections in Estonia and Norway, 
further to the voting system Polyas, which is mainly used for low 
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risk elections, and Helios, which emerged directly from security 
research. Section 4 briefly introduces each of these systems. 
Starting with section 5 we dedicate each section to one of the 
identified measures. In corresponding subsections we describe 
and discuss each measure and relate each one to its application 
within the different systems. 
2. OVERVIEW OF MEASURES FOR 
TRUST ESTABLISHMENT 
A literature review shows that there is only little work done on 
this topic. Although security in electronic voting is widely studied 
in the research community, the question of how to ideally benefit 
from security features at gaining the public's trust seems to be 
undiscussed. Certain measures may expose security features that 
solve one problem but introduce another. The prioritization of the 
two problems may be assessed variably among individuals and 
across societies. In our exposition we therefore discuss the 
measures in the light of both their benefits and pitfalls.   
The list below introduces the measures in the scope of this paper. 
The comments after each point give a first intuition f how the 
measures are meant to be applied or explained in order establish 
trust. Note, that we do not aim at specifying an instructive hand-
book on trust establishment, since it seems that the ideal selection 
and the concrete mode of application of the identified measures 
will vary over time, across societies, and in dependence of the 
type and character of the elections or referenda in question. We 
rather provide a starting point that should enable voting providers 
to estimate which ones they could employ in order to achieve a 
satisfying payoff in terms of trust.   
1. Transparency – This is the key-measure for the successful 
application of the remaining ones.  The more information is 
withheld, the less the public will appreciate the added value 
gained by applying the remaining measures. 
2. Evaluating the system according to international 
standards – This is meant to confirm to voters that the 
developed system corresponds with the one that is 
documented in terms of security. It also suggests that 
accredited experts actually took advantage of the op n 
documentation and performed a thorough analysis according 
to widely accepted security standards.  
3. Implementing separation of duty – If all computations are 
performed at one site, secrecy and integrity can be violated 
there. By splitting up computational tasks among multiple 
organizations, the two security features will only be broken 
if the persons in charge at all sites illegally collude. Trust 
among the public is thus not only determined by the trust 
they bring forward to an individual party. It is rather defined 
due to the organizational independence of multiple parties. 
4. Enabling verifiability  – By accessing the data collected by 
the voting servers, voters can verify that their vote is 
counted as intended. They can even verify that all col ected 
votes were cast by eligible voters and that all those votes are 
correctly counted. If all processed data can be verified as 
correct, it becomes obsolete to trust in any system players at 
preserving the integrity of the vote.  
5. Enabling vote updating – If voters can re-cast and replace 
previous electronic votes, vote-buying can be rendered far 
more difficult. Further, voters must not fear any unease or 
confusion during or after the process of casting a vote. 
6. Test elections – This measure allows voters to experience 
the full voting process beforehand. Thus, voters' doubts and 
concerns that emerge from the act of casting their vote itself 
can be addressed without requiring them to simultaneously 
question the success of a real election. 
7. Allowing independent implementations of voting client 
software – Certain groups of voters may distrust the correct 
functioning of the officially provided voting client software 
(the program they use for casting votes). Other groups may 
fear that they will not be able to operate the product 
correctly. In both cases the possibility of using an 
alternative product could be appreciated.  
Points 3-5 comprise measures that are directly derived from 
concrete technical system aspects. The technical system aspects in 
return imply security features. Unfortunately the prfect system, 
i.e. the one that solves all commonly quoted security concerns 
simultaneously, has not yet been invented. Accordingly, with 
contemporary systems the goal can never lie in suggesting to the 
public that every security gap is closed. Nevertheless, if the 
electorate gets an understanding of the security featur s, we 
believe that it will more likely assess certain security gaps as 
acceptable and gain trust towards a system in spite. Th  gained 
trust will be rather persistent since it is directly qualified by the 
system itself. In that spirit, measures 1-5 (our first class of 
measures) seem helpful as a starting point for explaining the 
strengths and limitations of those security features and thus aid 
voters at assessing the trustworthiness of the system as a whole. 
We point out that despite known security deficiencis the 
traditional paper-based model is also generally accepted. It seems 
reasonable to believe that the acceptance mostly relies on a 
common understanding of the remaining risks. 
While an appropriate application of measures 1 and 2 supports the 
payoff of measures 3-5, measures 6 and 7 do not directly imply 
enhanced security features of the overall system. Nevertheless, 
they address personal concerns that may keep voters from casting 
their vote.  Concerns may include distrust towards their own 
technical abilities or personal reservations towards the 
organizations who provide and operate the system. Measures 6 
and 7 form the second class. 
Due to space constraints the list of measures is incomplete. We 
leave further possibilities such as “voting by personalized codes” 
to address secrecy and integrity on the voters’ computers, or 
“employ cryptographic smartcards” to address sound remote 
authentication to future work.  
3. RELATED WORK 
Some of the measures listed in the previous section relate to the 
following three existing documents: 'Guidelines on transparency 
of e-enabled elections' published by the Council of Europe in [1], 
the discussion in [2] on advantages and disadvantages of two 
concrete measures, i.e. security evaluation versus verifiability, and 
the computation of a k-resilience value in [3] and [4] to clarify 
which entities (including persons, hardware and software) voters 
need to trust in terms of not maliciously collaborating in order to 
violate one of the security requirements. Further, [5] proposes a 
list of information that should be published in the context of an 
electronic voting project.  
In order to ensure that our list of measures is more c mprehensive 
than in existing literature and that the paper contains an objective 
analysis of these methods, we integrate the measures proposed in 
[1] and extend them. Further, our exposition of theverifiability 
and the evaluation measure takes into account corresponding 
discussions from [2]. Furthermore, the k-resilience approach from 
[3] and [4] is integrated in the separation of duty measure. Our 
statements on the transparency measure also include propositions 
from [5] regarding what kind of information should be published 
about an electronic voting system. 
4. VOTING SYSTEMS 
In this section we shortly introduce the internet vo ing systems 
and corresponding projects that we discuss in the light of the 
measures enlisted in section 2. We have selected the systems and 
projects that provide enough publicly available information.  
4.1 Estonian System 
The Estonian system was used at the national governmental level 
in the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections [6]. Estonians 
wanted to be the first nation to implement internet voting 
nationwide. They succeeded due to beneficial preconditi s. First 
of all the widely distributed national electronic identification 
document (ID card), secondly the huge amount of other e-
governmental applications enabled over the internet a d last but 
not least the confidence in the young government.  
In 2007 30,275 voters used internet voting, representing 3.4% of 
the eligible voters and 5.4% of the votes cast. In 2011 140,846 
voters used internet voting, representing 15,4% of the eligible 
voters, and 24,3% of the votes cast [7]. 
There are a couple of available sources which were used as input 
for the analysis below: The Election Assessment Mission Report 
of the OSCE “Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights” (ODIHR) [8], the Report for the Council of Europe by the 
European Union Democracy Observatory [9], and the web pages 
of the National Electoral Committee (NEC) [6],[7]. 
4.2 Norwegian System 
The Norwegian internet voting project has recently been started 
and is the one that is currently discussed most. The government’s 
motivation is to increase the availability of the voting system and 
to reduce costs in the long term. The internet voting channel is 
available for everyone in advance to the Election Day. After 
registering, voters authenticate based on a well-establi hed service 
called MinID, which has already been employed for other 
governmental purposes. Trials are planned in ten muicipalities 
for the 2011 county and municipal elections in fall. Afterwards, 
the parliament will decide whether to continue the project and 
enable remote electronic voting for federal elections in future. 
The employed system is provided by Scytl, a renowned provider 
of internet voting solutions. Of all internet voting systems that are 
currently in use for political votes, the Norwegian o e is by far the 
most documented. Documents describing the administrative 
context, including project guidelines, responsibilities and 
milestones, but also the technical system features th mselves 
including the source code can be accessed publicly through the 
project web-site [10],[11],[12]. 
4.3 Helios System for academic elections 
Based on preexisting cryptographic and web development 
technologies, the Helios system was designed to provide an 
accessible End-to-End verifiable remote electronic voting 
solution. Helios was first presented and mainly implemented by 
Ben Adida [13],[14][15]. However, Helios is far from being just a 
research project and an experimental prototype of a remote 
electronic voting system. There exist first user guidelines [16] and 
videos explaining the ballot casting process [17]. Different 
custom deployments of Helios were successfully used in actual 
legally binding elections, namely for the university'  presidential 
election in March 2009 at the Université Catholique de Louvain 
[18], 2010 for the election of student associations at Princeton 
University, and the election for the International Association of 
Cryptographic Research (IACR). In this paper, we ref r to the last 
deployment at IACR.  
4.4 Polyas System for the GI election 
The Polyas Internet voting system has been developed by 
Micromata Objects GmbH, a company headquartered in Kassel, 
Germany. Polyas has been in use since 1996 in various national 
and international elections in the private sector including those for 
the DFG - Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (German Science 
Foundation) -, the Initiative D21 Association, the Swiss Life 
Group (an insurance company), and both Finnish and German 
youth elections. Recently, it was used to enable remot  electronic 
voting for the first legally binding university election at the 
Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena, Germany. The most popular 
example has been the annual elections of the GI – Gesellschaft für 
Informatik (German Society for Computer Scientists) -, where it 
has been used in parallel with postal voting since 2004 (for 
example in 2010, 3193 members cast an electronic vote and only 
51 cast a mail vote). Therefore, in this paper we refer to the 
annual GI’s elections. Information can be found in [19] and [20] 
and on the Polyas web page [21]. 
Polyas has so far successfully handled all these elections. It is 
estimated that as of 2010, about one million legally binding votes 
have been cast using this voting system [20]. However, we note 
that these elections, similarly as the one run with Helios, bear a 
low public profile and a low security risk.  
5. TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency is the key element for establishing trust among the 
public. In the absence of a thorough documentation, the public 
would not be able to assess and appreciate the qualities of a 
system. Instead, trust would solely rely on vague assertions 
provided by the election organizers and their contractors. Notably, 
if authorities fail to inform the electorate on the applied security 
precautions, significant efforts may be wasted that old much 
potential of increasing trust. 
5.1 Description 
Relevant information includes the following1: 
• Full technical documentation of how the system is de igned 
functionally and technically (user interface, employed 
protocols, all levels of software documentation, source 
code) and of the technical and organizational enviro ments 
where the system is hosted.  The exposition should relate to 
a security goal that is clearly defined. This should a low 
                                                            
1 Note that we exclude information which is already relevant for 
traditional paper based elections like the notification of 
elections and the nomination of candidates. 
 
independent experts to understand and appreciate the 
security features, and establish their individual assessment. 
• A simplified documentation of how the system works under 
the application of the chosen measures to establish trust.  
They can be explained easily on a high level and allow the 
broad public to assess the trustworthiness of a system. In the 
exposition limitations of security should also be pointed out 
in terms of those measures. Independent technical experts 
should confirm to the public that the simplified 
documentation has been correctly derived from the full 
technical documentation and that the exposition of the
limitations in security is complete. 
• A public platform for collecting and answering questions 
and doubts among the electorate.  
• Administrative project information including a project plan, 
the call for tender and minutes of meetings. All involved 
parties and their responsibilities should be clearly declared.  
• Full documentation of all conducted evaluations, also 
assessments provided by independent experts. It should 
relate to the system documentation (full and simplified) and 
most importantly to concerns expressed by the public.  
The published documents should clearly refer to each other and 
need to be available early enough for everyone to read and 
analyze. Thus, doubts can be ruled out early enough before going 
live. 
5.2 Discussion 
In order to be able to provide all this information, the 
transparency policy should be explained and discussed with the 
vendor before the tender. Generally, companies will not likely be 
thrilled about sharing too many details on their technology with 
the market. 
By consistently following the transparency guidelin, the project 
will become more expensive for various reasons: First of all, the 
vendor will most likely ask for an extra compensation. Also a lot 
of documents have to be produced and managed. Further it is 
required to hire extra staff to answer general and specific 
questions on the documentation and the system.  
The following issues related to changes in the system during the 
preparation phase should be discussed and corresponding 
guidelines set before starting the project: 
- When is information ready to be published? (Not too early, 
because items may change, but not too late to allow 
analysis.) 
- How should changes in the full system documentation be 
managed? 
- How should change recommendations be handled after 
costly and time-consuming evaluations have been 
successfully performed?  (Implement change and re-
evaluate, or go ahead as planned.) 
Further, publishing all this information bears the risk that 
someone exposes vulnerabilities that give the project bad press. 
The risk of people losing blind trust just due to the mere fact the 
system's security aspects are debated seems real. However, if 
security problems can be solved due to transparency, the election 
authorities can gain much credibility when explaining their 
system.  
5.3 Systems in Use  
In the past, electronic voting projects generally published only 
scarce information about their systems. The public do umentation 
was incomplete and kept on a very high level of exposition. 
Notably it did not allow to analyze and understand the system and 
its security in depth. Generally only the average voter is addressed 
and given a high level understanding of the system, mostly 
focused on why the secrecy of the vote will not be at stake. In 
some cases it is possible to get more information and lso the 
source code after signing a very restrictive NDA. The two systems 
on which finally more public information is made available are 
the Norwegian and the Helios system.  
Specifically, the following transparency levels in terms of 
published information are reached in the different systems:  
The source code of the Estonian system and log files after an 
election can only be reviewed after signing a restrictive NDA. 
Interested people have to visit an office where the information is 
provided on some machine. Thus, it is not possible to use own 
equipment for the review. However, information about the 
Estonian system is available for average voters and distributed to 
the public explaining them how the system operates on a very 
high level and in particular that the internet voting system exactly 
mimics the mail voting system. This is explained in such an 
approachable way that people believe to understand he voting 
system and that it is secure.  
The Norwegian project has chosen transparency as one of their 
main guidelines. The available documentation shows high quality 
and is presented in a logical, accessible structure on their web-site 
[10]. The protocol underlying the system is presented in [11]. The 
same document provides an analysis of its security features. The 
security objectives are defined in [12]. Furthermore, the source 
code is publicly available and Common Criteria Security Targets. 
Since the project is still at an early stage, one may expect to find 
detailed information on the implementation of their system soon. 
Documentation about the Polyas system as well as the ource code 
is made available after signing an NDA. Some people from the GI 
signed this NDA and reviewed the source code and some 
documents. For non-experts there exists a high level explanation 
of the system as well as a FAQ and screen shots showing the vote 
casting process.  
As the Helios system is an open source project and p pers on the 
protocol have been published on several conferences, d tailed 
information is available including a security concept. However, as 
it is an academic project the specification of the source code is 
hard to understand due to missing or inconsistent documentation. 
For the average voter, there exist videos accessibl on 
youtube.com, showing how to cast and how to verify the correct 
casting of a vote. However, background information  
verifiability and its inherent benefits and pitfalls is not included.  
6. EVALUATION 
People are used to the approach of having accredited companies 
or agencies evaluate products (devices, food, but also software). 
Accordingly, the evaluation of a voting system according to 
standardized and internationally recognized procedures is critical 
at establishing trust.  
6.1 Description 
Some may argue that an evaluation of the remote electronic voting 
system is not necessary for systems that implement E2E 
verifiability. According to [2] this is not the case because 
verifiability only covers the integrity of the election outcome but 
not privacy and many other requirements. In addition, people who 
are not familiar with verifiability and the related cryptography, 
will gain more trust if they know that qualified experts checked 
the system according some standard evaluation approches. 
Notably, publishing the detailed system documentation alone does 
not automatically imply that experts will thoroughly look into 
them, as this costs time and money.  
Such a standardized evaluation approach should contain formal 
logical and mathematical methods to prove that the system 
ensures the security requirements. Correspondingly, most of the 
evaluation techniques address security. However, also the 
usability should be evaluated.  
Regardless of the item under evaluation, it is important to base the 
evaluation on international standards (in general ISO) or 
recognized research methods. Thus, it is ensured that t e 
evaluation methods, depth and processes are transpare t. 
Ideally, such an evaluation would envelope the following 
approaches: 
• Formal protocol analysis and proofs including the 
identification of underlying assumptions fitting to the 
published security concept (see Section 4) 
• Common Criteria evaluation [28] for software components 
of the voting system e.g. according to or based on the 
existing Protection Profile [29] 
• ISO 27001 [30] or similar standards to evaluate the security 
of the infrastructure (servers, backup systems, 
organizational measures, etc.) in which the internet voting 
software is used; again including the identification f 
underlying assumptions fitting to the published security 
concept 
• Observation of security critical processes during preparation 
and election; as due to our knowledge there exists no 
standard; at least a concept should be developed in the 
preparation phase of the project 
Whatever path is taken, it should be explained and its choice 
justified to the public. 
6.2 Discussion 
All of these evaluations are costly and time-consuming. Thus, 
evaluations have to be started early enough (probably between 9 
and 12 month before the day the certificate is requi d). Notably 
special knowledge to produce corresponding documents is 
required. In addition, the Protection Profile proposed in [29] only 
covers basic requirements and in particular does not address 
verifiability. Correspondingly, this Protection Profile needs to be 
extended for broader application. 
Such security evaluations are very static and the certifi ate is only 
valid for one particular implementation of a system. A re-
evaluation after modifications is required. Thus, changes shortly 
before the election would mean that a non-certified system is used 
for the election (compare to section 5.2).  
6.3 Systems in Use 
In many projects, the security of the voting protocl and/or the 
voting software and/or the infrastructure has been analyzed by 
internal experts. However, it remains unclear who and how many 
people with which background and expertise, using which 
methods have participated and how deep the evaluation went. 
This intransparency results in mistrust.  
The Polyas system is currently undergoing a Common Criteria 
evaluation according to the Protection Profile proposed in [29]. 
Also the Norwegian project announced that they will go for a 
Common Criteria evaluation and even a more thorough one than 
demanded in [29] before using the voting system for further 
elections after the local elections this year in September. In 
addition, they announce to run the voting software only in data 
processing centers that are certified according to ISO 27001 [30]. 
The only system that – due to our knowledge – has been analyzed 
scientifically regarding its usability is the Helios system [32]. The 
user study identifies a few flaws in the interface design.  
A formal voting protocol analysis has only been done on the 
Norwegian one. The analysis shows many beneficial security 
features. However, it lies in the nature of protocol definitions that 
they do not specify all technical particularities it takes for defining 
a full system. The protocol analysis thus simply assumes 
beneficial security features of some of the components. Once the 
detailed technical specification documents are made vailable, 
trust would benefit from an analysis on whether thesystem 
succeeds in complying with the initial assumptions  the security 
features.  
The Estonian project applies a different approach. T ey have 
auditors who have a booklet describing all steps administrators 
have to take during the election set up, the election phase and the 
tallying. They are present together with the administrators to take 
care that the administrators take only these steps and log this 
manually. As it is unclear what is described in thebooklet and 
who produced and checked it, this measures seems to be weak at 
establishing trust.  
7. SEPARATION OF DUTY 
If a process is designed to output data, appropriate verification 
mechanisms might allow acknowledging its correct execution.2  
However, it is much harder to verify that all copies of critical data 
have been deleted, when they are supposed to, or that 
computations have not been performed, when they are not 
supposed to.  
7.1 Description 
Particularly, no system entity should compute the information 
showing how voters voted (privacy) and no partial result of the 
ballot should be available prior to the closing of the polls 
(fairness). Although the Council of Europe recommendations [1] 
do not explicitly enlist these requirements, it seems reasonable to 
believe that they underlie the public acceptance within any 
electorate. In [22] the effect of doubts regarding privacy on 
internet consumer behaviour has been observed. Similarly, 
establishing trust in secrecy is bound to have a positive effect on 
the acceptance of a voting system.  
By distributing secrecy-critical duties, one can exclude the event 
of a single entity being able to break the voters' privacy or 
fairness. Under separation of duty, secrecy is only broken if a 
                                                            
2 The question of how to verify the integrity of an election is 
discussed in the next section. Separation of duty with regard to 
integrity is also discussed there, i.e. as a weaker replacement of 
verifiability. Other requirements in this context like robustness 
are left for future work. 
whole group of entities fail in following their respective 
procedures correctly.  
Responsibilities can be separated on various levels, i.e. 
organizational (enforcing restricted access to information within 
an organization), architectural (physically and logically separating 
information) and evolutionary (having the organizations in charge 
use their own equipment, particularly use self-develop d or well-
established 3rd party software). The degree of the gained trust 
heavily relies on the selection of the responsible parties, their 
ability to perform their duties independently and to confirm to the 
public that they have done so truthfully. 
Trust in secrecy will certainly benefit from the good reputation of 
a vote organizer in combination with experts who confirm the 
implementation of sophisticated measures to guarantee for 
secrecy. However “real” trust as specified in the introduction 
grounds on an explanation on how secrecy is ensured. Id ntifying 
a number of independent organizations and stating that privacy 
will only be broken if all organizations collude can be easily 
understood. Finally, instead of requiring all voters to trust in the 
same organization, it is sufficient for each voter to trust in merely 
one out of all participating ones. In a society where individuals 
tend to confide in the party they vote for, it may seem reasonable 
to distribute duties evenly across the political spectrum. 
7.2 Discussion  
Separation of duty has the potential of drastically reducing the 
probability that secrecy properties are broken. Yet, the extent of 
the gained trust strongly depends on the degree of separation 
(organizational, architectural, and evolutionary). While there is an 
obvious benefit in running computations independently at 
different sites (architectural), the payoff is limited when each 
party runs the same software, since trust in the ovrall system 
again reduces to one entity, i.e. the producer of the software. 
Similarly, separation of duty is not fully in place when all 
involved parties need to store their data at a commn central 
server despite using self developed software (evolutionary). On 
the other hand, splitting responsibilities to a full degree is 
expensive and operationally complicated. Nevertheless, there are 
technical measures to allow critical computations to be performed 
not necessarily by the full group of players, but only by a fraction 
[23]. Thus, the failures of few system players will not affect the 
success of the whole system.  
Separation of duty only makes sense if it is taken as a guideline 
that is consistently followed. For instance it will not help much to 
define a system in which secrecy-critical information, such as the 
secret keys for decrypting votes, is initially generat d by one 
single entity on behalf of all other parties. If there is a need for 
making such compromises, it is inevitable to declare the risk 
openly in the documentation at an early stage. If the security gap 
is discovered at a point when elections have already been held 
under the impression of separation of duty, voters may feel 
misled. 
7.3 Systems in Use 
A minimal degree of separation of duty on the organiz tional level 
will need to be implemented in any system. Otherwise at least one 
employee could inherently access the critical data.  
In that sense the Estonian system employs multiple servers to 
provide separation of duty on an organizational level. By having 
multiple election officers provide their individual keys to decrypt 
the votes contained by the hardware security module (HSM), the 
regular decryption process cannot be executed prematurely.  
Before the votes reach the HSM they are mixed by one server for 
anonymization. Thus, here separation of duty is not implemented 
as there is only one server mixing the encrypted votes. (The server 
holds the information showing the order of the decrypted votes 
and can thus reveal privacy.) 
Polyas and the Norwegian system both distribute secrecy critical 
duties between two sites. In the case of Polyas, one site is 
provided by its producer Micromata, the other site is operated by 
the organizer of the election. In Norway information is split 
between two governmental organizations that act independently 
and are located 700 km apart. 
Helios provides the possibility to select more than one “trustee” 
and the idea is that only if all trustees collaborate maliciously the 
secrecy of the vote can be broken. However, using oly the 
software from the web would also mean that the software for 
different entities is programmed by the same team and lso all 
components are hosted by this team. Correspondingly, before 
using Helios for legal binding elections software components have 
to be re-programmed and hosted by different parties.  
Note, in all four cases the employed software is produced by the 
same company, which is not ideal. We conclude that separation of 
duty is implemented to some degree in all projects. However, 
there is much potential for improvement. 
8. VERIFIABILITY 
In traditional voting voters witness their ballot reach its 
destination inside the ballot box themselves. Knowig that the 
ballot box is under constant surveillance, they are reassured that 
their vote will be included in the counting procedure. In some 
countries concerned citizens are even allowed to witness the 
counting and verify that the staff performs their tasks with care. It 
seems natural that citizens who appreciate these privileges will 
ask for strong integrity reassurances in internet voting as well. 
Based on a verdict of the German federal constitutional court in 
2009, German voters are even explicitly required to be able to 
verify that their vote is correctly recorded and considered in the 
final outcome. Complying with this requirement involves 
introducing appropriate technical measures. 
8.1 Description 
Voting systems are widely considered verifiable (also called end-
to-end verifiable) when corresponding with the following three 
properties. 
• According  to [1],[24], individual verifiability enables the 
voter to verify that his vote is cast as intended an that it is 
stored in the electronic ballot box as cast. 
• According to [1],[24], universal verifiability enables the 
voter and everyone else to verify that all votes stored at the 
voting server are properly tallied. 
• According to [25], eligibility verifiability enables anyone to 
check that each vote in the election outcome was cast by a 
registered voter and there is at most one vote per vot .  
Ideally, the available mechanisms will offer verifiab lity without 
requiring voters to trust any system players. The key to achieving 
that lies in publishing the electronic ballot box along with all data 
needed to assert the correct execution of the tallying procedure. 
Apart from information taken from the cast ballots, the data will 
generally comprise so-called zero-knowledge proofs t  justify all 
partial computation steps on a public bulletin board. These proofs 
mathematically reveal enough information to provide evidence of 
correct tallying; however they do not reveal any secrecy-critical 
information.  
8.2 Discussion 
The application of the required cryptographic techniques yields 
the outlined approach very promising. However, it comes along 
with drawbacks that may lead to the decision not to provide full 
end-to-end verifiability because of security gaps that are 
introduced due to its implementation. 
1. If voters are provided with a proof to confirm that their vote 
will be counted as intended, they can use that proof t  
reveal to a third party how they voted. The existence of such 
„receipts“ increase the risk of vote buying. Technical 
approaches to solve that dilemma have been introduced 
[26], however it will take further research before th se ideas 
have sufficiently matured for efficient application in 
practice. 
2. Privacy relies on the long-term security of the employed 
cryptographic techniques. While experts will find it
reasonable to believe that these are powerful enough to 
maintain privacy during the coming few decades, one must 
assume that somewhen in the far future the privacy of 
today's electorate will be broken. Whether coming 
generations may be made responsible for unpopular po itical 
views of their ancestors is a matter of debate. 
These concerns may lead to a solution where only auditors are 
given the access to the full collection of voting data and perform 
the remaining verification steps not granted to the public. 
Nevertheless, under the assumption of appropriate separation of 
duty, voters can be strongly reassured that their vote is counted as 
intended. In that case it is crucial that voters are told what they 
actually verify themselves and what aspects are delegated to 
auditors. This can be easily explained in terms of separation of 
duty as exposed in the previous section. The trust among the 
public then depends on the trust they bring forward towards these 
authorities and their ability to publicly confirm that they have 
performed their tasks independently and truthfully. 
Further, end-to-end verification using the contemporary methods 
grounds on calculations one cannot perform with pen and paper. 
Successful verification thus requires the electorate’s rust in the 
programs provided to perform the verification and the integrity of 
the computer the verification is performed on. Neverth less, 
verification steps can be repeated using different pla forms and 
independent third party software. 
The responsible authorities need to establish legal guidelines to 
handle cases where voters claim that their verificat on failed. 
Apparently, vote updating, discussed in the next section, 
constitutes an appropriate auxiliary instrument. 
8.3 Systems in Use 
The Helios system is the strongest in fulfilling the criteria for end-
to-end verifiability: The relevant cryptographic data is displayed 
to the user who can then use third party software and verify that 
his vote has been considered in the final tally along with all other 
ones. However, note that the strong sense of verifiability allows 
voters to obtain a receipt to reveal to others how they voted. The 
Polyas system only provides universal verifiability and the 
possibility to verify that votes have been cast as intended. 
However voters need to trust in one specific site in the backend 
(i.e. one server) in storing their vote correctly. The Norwegian 
system also provides verifiability in terms of “cast as intended”, 
while “stored cast” is granted under the premise that at least one 
of any of the two backend sites follows its procedur s correctly. 
However, the universal and eligibility verification is only granted 
to auditors, not to the people sitting at home. The el ction 
officials have chosen this approach for making it impossible for 
voters to prove to third parties that do not participate in the 
system infrastructure how they voted.  In the Estonian system, no 
verifiability is provided.  
9. VOTE UPDATING 
Vote updating (re-cast and replace the previously cast electronic 
vote) is a measure to establish trust regarding integrity of the 
published result, in the sense that the published result captures the 
electorate’s free will. 
9.1 Description 
In many cases remote electronic voting is introduce as an 
additional channel to traditional paper based elections at polling 
stations. For the traditional channel the vote casting process is 
protected by a polling booth and the poll workers, whereas for the 
remote electronic voting channel, the vote casting process is 
conducted in an uncontrolled environment, i.e. where the voter 
might be observed or influenced when casting his vote. In order to 
undermine voters' fears and inherently generate trust in the remote 
electronic voting system, the election authorities should 
implement vote updating. This allows a voter to update his 
electronic vote multiple times, particularly until he is convinced 
that he successfully cast his vote unobserved and without being 
influenced. Given this possibility, vote-buying becomes far less 
interesting. 
Voters might distrust the voting system only after the experience 
of casting their vote. This might occur for instance when they 
misinterpret information presented to them, or when detecting 
malware on their PC after casting their vote. Correspondingly, 
they would not know whether their vote is sent and stored 
properly or whether the process was interrupted before.  Again, in 
order to take away corresponding fears from the voter and 
correspondingly gain trust in the remote electronic voting system, 
the election authorities can implement vote updating i cluding 
overwriting the e-votes with a paper vote. 
9.2 Discussion 
There are different ways to implement vote updating (compare to 
[27]) while they have different advantages and disadvantages. In 
general, replacing electronic votes by a paper one can support 
receipt-freeness in the context of verifiable electronic voting 
systems. A general challenge is to ensure that the last vote is 
counted and no problems by replay-attacks or delays on the 
network can cause that an earlier vote is counted.  
Opponents of vote updating argue that vote updating influences 
the value and character of an election. They argue that the act of 
casting a vote is something special and should not be repeatable 
otherwise it gets the character of a game.  
9.3 Systems in Use 
Vote updating has become popular after Estonia has implemented 
it for its parliamentary elections in 2007. Apart from Estonia, it is 
also applied in the Norwegian and the Helios system.  
The only system that does not offer vote updating is Polyas. They 
claim that this is to maintain the seriousness of an election. Also 
from a technical point of view, vote updating would not easily be 
integrated as the system separates information on the voter from 
information on the vote already during the stage of casting. Thus 
it becomes problematic to elicit the vote to be replaced. 
10. TEST ELECTION 
Test elections before the binding elections enable vot rs to get 
familiar and learn how to use the system properly.  
10.1 Description 
All the other described trust establishment measures can be 
supported by implementing test elections before the main election. 
Such test elections would enable voters to “play” with the new 
voting system, get used to it, cast test votes without being afraid to 
make mistakes. They can also get used to new mechanisms like 
verifiability and vote updating.  
Such a test election should be as similar to the main election as 
possible in order not to confuse voters, i.e. they should receive 
their login data through the same channel as for the main election. 
Also the hotline to call in case of questions or problems should be 
available. 
It is not recommended to use a pre-system for test el c ions, with 
reduced functionality as this might confuse the voter to see a 
different system for the real election. In addition, there should be 
enough time for the test election. Thus, every potential voter 
should have the chance to test the system.  
Besides running a test election right before the main election one 
could also run a mock election in parallel to a paper based 
election and enable everyone who is interested in to cast in 
addition an electronic vote. Here, the paper votes are the legal 
binding ones and the electronic voting system is only to enable 
voters to gain experience with the internet voting system.  
Sometimes, ‘test elections’ are also implemented with selected 
voters to get feedback about the interface. As this is part of the 
usability evaluation this does not count under the category test 
election.  
10.2 Discussion 
Almost no disadvantages can be identified for this measure. The 
only disadvantages are the additional costs and the additional time 
required to run the test election. Notably, the final system needs to 
be ready prior to the real election.  
10.3 Systems in Use 
In most of the projects they have test elections but in general not 
for all voters but only for a selected group.  
Estonia runs test elections before all parliamentary elections but 
due to our knowledge only for selected voters. The same is true 
for the GI elections. For each GI election, Micromata runs a test 
election for 100 randomly selected voters. They canalso give 
feedback to further improve the system. Thus, this helps only 
partially to get used to the system. However, the situation is 
different as Polyas has been used for GI elections si ce 2005. 
Thus, most voters are already familiar with the system.  
As Helios is an open source system, it is easy to conduct a test 
election. When the system was used for the IACR elections they 
formally run a test election.  
In Norway, they currently run test elections, however using a 
system with reduced functionality; particularly the SMS for 
verifiability is not yet implemented. 
11. ALLOWING INDEPENDENT 
IMPLEMETATIONS OF VOTING CLIENT  
Allowing and supporting the development of client software by 
third parties is meant to address concerns regarding the 
trustworthiness of the official product. 
11.1 Description 
Voters need to have a high degree of trust in the client side voting 
software they run on their home PC because the software 
generally gets secrecy-critical information, i.e. the vote to be cast 
and also the identity of the voter at authentication. By sending out 
that information fairness and privacy can be broken. Furthermore, 
voters may fear that the software neglects the user's input and 
casts a vote for the wrong party and misleads at verification. 
Voters who personally feel that the official vendor was the wrong 
choice will benefit from this measure, too. Thus, the voter does 
not need to trust one particular client but can use on  from any 
entity he thinks is trustworthy, for instance his preferred party. 
Further, a variety of clients is likely to attract more voters. For 
instance, people who fear being misled during the voting process 
due to their own inexperience with the internet may be provided 
with a client that offers the guidance tailored for their needs.   
11.2 Discussion  
By publishing a documentation of the technical interface used on 
the backend site, it becomes very simple for third parties to 
develop their own voting client. Even people with limited 
engineering experience will be able to produce and distribute their 
own software. This effect will allow voters to choose their 
preferred product out of a great choice.  
Although this freedom of choice will improve the trust of 
individual voters regarding their own vote, the approach holds the 
risk of having malicious software in the market. Client software 
could potentially be designed to influence voters in their choice, 
or even worse, reveal or alter their choice unnoticed. Under this 
premise voters may tend to lose confidence in the integrity of the 
published election outcome. Nevertheless this can be mitigated by 
allowing only clients that have been assessed by accredited 
institutions. In any case voters need to be educated on their risks 
when using software from a third party. Election authorities need 
to assess whether the gained trust due to this appro ch is likely to 
outrule the risk of malicious software being spread.  
11.3 Systems in Use 
None of the projects in our scope encourages people t  develop 
further voting clients. Nevertheless, the Helios sytem is open 
source and thus allows deducing rather easily how t develop 
another voting client. Similarly in Polyas one can elicit how to 
make a client by reading the html code in the browser. As in 
Helios the same should be possible in the Norwegian project as 
soon as the source code is made available. Whether they plan to 
publish technical documentation of their server interface and 
motivate to use it for engineering voting clients is still unclear. 
The Estonian system does not publicly document its software on a 
technical level, which makes it rather difficult todeduce the 
necessary details to implement an own client.  
  
12. CONCLUSION 
Technical research in voting technology has made significant 
advances. Many schemes have been proposed to meet the high 
security standards required at elections. Although not all concerns 
can yet be addressed simultaneously, experts feel that the 
contemporary state of research allows developing solutions that 
yield remaining risks and dangers negligible. We have rgued that 
the discussed measures are suited to allow the broad public to feel 
alike. Further measures will be discussed in a survey in the near 
future.  
We have argued that transparency will allow independent experts 
to assess a system's qualities and establish their opinion. Since 
transparency relates to a system's technical security features, 
experts are likely to gain rather than lose trust in a system, given 
that it exhibits the expected qualities. Under this premise alone, 
the technical laymen still do not know which experts to take as 
their reference. Hereby, the primary difficulty does not lie in 
estimating whether the experts have the skills it takes for a 
thorough assessment. The difficult question lies in estimating 
which experts share their moral standards. The transp rency 
measure, thus being the most critical one, foresees a 
documentation to address the majority of the public who are not 
aware of technical particularities. We have explained why the 
documentation should describe the remaining dangers and risks in 
a non-technical language. This allows anyone who is interested to 
assess the trustworthiness of a system on the base of their own 
moral standards. Since irregularities during an election process 
can be explained in terms of the widely accepted risks, it seems 
less likely that voters lose their trust once it has been established. 
We have shown that each of the proposed measures is employed 
by at least one of the four presented internet voting systems. 
While some have been consciously ruled out (e.g. Polyas 
explicitly excludes “vote updating”), others are often implemented 
only to a minor degree.  
It is the task of the responsible election authorities to estimate 
which concerns regarding security are the most prominent among 
their citizens. The measures should then be selected a cordingly.  
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